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Commentary on “Bivalence, Theories of Truth,
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Bernd Buldt
April 19, 2012
0. Introduction 1
Alison has presented a clear, well-structured and well-argued paper. And it
was reasonably short and didn’t need extra time—things that rarely happen
at a philosophy conference. The only problem I have with the paper is that
I don’t understand it. The topics Alison raised are complex and require me
to think longer about and more deeply than I had time to. To make things
worse, I got lost already on the first two pages; so this is why I will limit
myself mostly to preliminary observations. But this is not Alison’s fault;
not at all! Blame Aristotle, or me, or both. My main reservation will be
that the paper is an exercise in ancient ontology and logic; but the ball game
has changed, which means that there not much we could gain from Aristotle
today.
1. Aristotle’s World
Propositions. According to Aristotle, declarative sentences are “something
about something” (τι κατα´ τινoς): ‘something,’ namely, the subject S
of the sentence (υpioκι´µνoν), is qualified as ‘something’ by a predicate
P (κατηγo%ι´α); P is predicated of S (κατηγo%ι˜ν) or attributed to S
(υpiα´%χιν). The subject S, however, always denotes (σηµαι´νι) a sub-
stance (oυσι´α); a subject can be characterized as what never can serve as a
predicate ([Cat] V).
1Not much, just some quick notes and key phrases to remind me of what I wanted to
say.
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Substances. Aristotle conceives of substances in a biological terms. Similar
to a seed that potentially contains the mature tree, substances contain their
own future, as least potentially so. (Admittedly, that’s Leibniz’ Aristotle,
but here I suppress details for brevity’s sake.) Equally important, all prop-
erties a substance may have are monadic properties, monadic properties our
language denotes with predicates P . Notions that we now render as two-
(or more) place relations, Aristotle takes them as predicates. For example,
causality according to Aristotle is not a two-place relation between a cause
and an effect, like a fire causing the destruction of the building, but a poten-
tial fire has, namely, fire has the property to destroy buildings. Note that in
an Aristotelian framework it would make some sense to ascribe substances
not only causal powers but, by extension, also the power to make sentences
true or false.
Timed Truth. In this framework, and this seems to be an assumption shared
among all ancient writers, truth is timed. When Aristotle is talking about
truth, stock examples are not mathematical truths but, in a world filled with
change, empirical statements. While it doesn’t seem to make sense to ask
”For how long will four remain divisible by two,” it does make sense to ask
”For how long will Callias remain healthy?” In this light, it made perfect
sense for Aristotle to raise the question how the three tenses (past, present,
and future) affect the truth of declarative sentences. Since everything we
observe is interpreted in terms of substances and their emerging and vanish-
ing properties, truth is linked to these changes and is timed, not sempiternal.
Underdeterminacy of the Future. Unlike Leibniz, who would later try to give
a more consistent and more rigorous version of Aristotle’s ontology, but also
unlike the Stoics, and Chrysippus in particular, Aristotle seems to have been
reluctant to assume that the changes substances undergo are deterministic
in character; at least, or so it may seem, he denied that we know what those
laws are due to the overwhelming complexity of intricate interactions among
them.
2. Where I got lost
Definition 1 (explanation); quote: “Notice that my definition of bivalence
requires that every declarative sentence has a truth-value” (p. 1).
Truth-Values. Do sentences have truth-values? Obviously, this is how many
speak. But do sentences have truth-values as properties like concrete objects
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have colors as properties? Tarski semantics has become an almost canonical
way to speak about truth. In Tarski’s world, however, truth is not a predi-
cate sentences have (or have not) but a relation that obtains (or does not)
between a situation (a possible world, a structure) and declarative sentences.
Thus, if we assume that Tarski semantics are our current gold standard for
truth talk, then, strictly speaking, sentences don’t have truth-values.
Bivalence. Do sentences necessarily have a truth value? It depends, since
what matters is what logic one is talking about. The principle of bivalence
has been contested, and rightly so, I believe, by people working in the field
of constructive logics. For otherwise we allow logic to become some sort
of magic wand with which we can prove that certain objects with specific
properties exists, while at the same time we are utterly unable to produce
a witness, an example to prove we were right. From my point of view, biva-
lence is therefore not a logical principle, since there is not just one logic but
many, and it may hold as a principle in some and fail in others.
Digression: Principle of Disjunction. Similar reservations apply to what is
later introduced in Definition 5 as the principle of disjunction (p. 5). Ver-
sions of it may hold or not, depending on the logic or the concept of truth
one is assuming. (Test, in particular, what happens if Q = ¬P .)
Definition 2; quote: “[a sentence q] is true if and only if there there is some
current fact that makes it true, i.e., the current state of affairs is such that
E will occur.” (p. 1).
As I tried to say earlier, in Aristotle’s world substances (or state of affairs)
can be considered truth-makers. I don’t see how this is justified in Tarski’s
world. The number two doesn’t make the number three bigger just because
the relation 2 < 3 obtains. Likewise, a situation S doesn’t make a proposi-
tion p true just because the situation S |= p obtains. Let me explain.
Assume Sp to denote the present situation (the world as it is now), and
Sf some future situation. Let E be an event, qp the sentence “E occurs
(presently),” and qf the sentence “E will occur (in the future).” Then I
take Alison’s strong correspondence theory of truth to say:
Sp |= qf iff ∃SoA ∈ Sp : SoA makes (Sp |= qf )
& SoA causes SoA′, with SoA′ ∈ Sf
& SoA′ makes (Sp |= qf )
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